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FOREWORD 
Ever since Mr. Bevin's speech in the House of Commons 
on 22nd January, 1948, Western Union has been on everybody's 
lips. The idea, long since conceived in the minds of a few 
idealists, suddenly leapt into p11blic prominence in many nations. 
Somewhat naturally, the idea outgrew its own strength : 
its great emotional attraction obscured the many real diffic11lties 
involved. The Hague Conference was the apotheosis of this 
phenomenal growth of an jdea, and characteristically that 
conference sacrificed any clarity of thought or definition to 
the emotional idea of u11ity. Unity they achieved, thanks 
to Mr. Churchill's oratory, but unity for what purpose is not 
clear. The logical French set the cat among the pigeons by 
attempting to pin down the political resolution to the brass 
tacks of Federalism. 
The task still remains therefore of examining rationally 
all the implications of Western Union. A welter of words 
has been written and spoken on this subject. But we make no 
apology for adding to this welter by devoti11g a complete 
number of the Fabian Quarterly to Western Union. For it 
is vitally important that socialists should examine it in. all its 
aspects. It is not easy to divide one aspect from another : 
the aspects we have chosen-the politica1, the economic and 
the imperial-are inextricably interwoven. Each article therefore 
has a direct bearing on the other two, and they should all be 
read in conjunction. As a result, this number of the Quarterly 
is more of a pamphlet than a periodical, and we hope that 
it will be treated as such. Our authors-Denis Healey, G. D. H. 
Cole and Rita Hinden-need no introduction to Fabians. 
THE EDITOR 
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WESTERN UNION 
-THE POLITICAL ASPECT 
by Denis Healey 
The idea of a European Union has always exercised great emotional 
power, and now that the Marshall Plan seems to put such a Union within 
our grasp, a haze of comfortable idealism has confused much thinking 
on the subject. Socialists who recoil automatically from the suggestion 
that Britain should. become the Forty-ninth State in the American Union 
treat diffidence about becoming the Sixteenth State in a European Union 
as self-evident heresy. In its ignorant enthusiasm for the general principle, 
public opinion has fastened on certain familiar ideas and absurdly 
exaggerated their relevance . . For example, though at the moment tariffs 
scarcely influence the flow of intra-European trade, which is clogged 
mainly by payments' difficulties and by government planning of imports, 
the most popular laxative is a Customs Union. Middle-·class intellectuals 
urge a reduction in the British bread ration to help our continental 
neighbours, though France is sowing twenty per cent less wheat than 
before the war. Supporters of federalism denounce the wickedness of 
unlimited national sovereignty as if the nations of Europe had not already 
restricted their freedom by innumerable agreements to coordinate their 
activities. This welter of passionate ignorance may have disastrous 
results unless Socialists analyse the problems of European Union in 
all their real complexity with a clear conception of the purposes which 
such a Union is intended to serve. Whatever general reasons there· may 
be for pref erring international to national action, there are no a priori 
grounds for desiring any European Union irrespective of its character. 
After all, Hitler came nearer to integrating the economies of Europe 
in his New Order than democratic governments can hope to come in 
a similar space of time. ' 
There are two main problems which the free nations of Europe 
have in common and which their growing cooperation is intended to 
solve. The first is the inability of most of the European countries to pay 
for the supplies they need from the dollar area ; even if all the over-
optimistic assumptions made by the Paris Committee last year are fulfilled, 
when Marshall aid ends Western Europe will be able to pay for only 
two thirds of her dollar needs. Yet a failure to bridge the dollar gap 
will compel each country to choose between a catastrophic fall in its 
standard of life and the associated political and social upheavals, and 
seeking further American aid at any price which is demanded. Though 
certain countries, notably Switzerland and Sweden, might be able to 
solve their dollar problem unilaterally, each country recognises that 
serious disorder among its neighbours would probably infect itself. 
The second problem lies in the danger that weakness in Western 
Europe may encourage direct or indirect aggression by the Soviet Union ; 
. 
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here too, though certain of the nations in Western Europe feel reasonably 
secure against immediate attack, in varying degrees they all recognise 
a common interest in preventing Russian power from extending further 
West ; in particular America's direct concern that the European shores 
" of the Atlantic should remain in friendly hands makes it probable that 
war anywhere in Europe would quickly become a world war. If they 
can produce between them a unified security system, the nations of Europe 
believe that they will reduce at once the dangers both of Russian aggression 
and of new American counter-measures wl1ich might be unwelcome. 
In fact the nations of Western Europe have already admitted that 
they can. only solve the central problems of their economic and foreign 
policy by united action, that they stand or fall together. But for this 
very reason, the nations of Europe will judge any measures of cooperation 
suggested to them by their relevance to these central problems-the 
bridging of the dollar gap and security against Soviet aggression. 
No form of Western Union which fails to solve these problems can hope 
to survive. And to these two criteria Socialists would add a third ; 
no form of Union should be supported which jeopardizes the success 
of existing socialist governments or which discourages the development 
of democratic socialism elsewhere. 
Having agreed on the purposes which European Union must serve, 
we must next consider the machinery which already exists to further 
European cooperation, apd the differing national attitudes which have 
determined the present form of that machinery. 
The Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva expresses the 
common interest in economic cooperation which is shared by countries 
on both sides of the Stettin-Trieste line. But since Russia is fast integrating 
Eastern Europe into her own Eurasian strategic and economic system, 
EC E has been unable to do much more than to collect and analyse 
information, to suggest action, and to continue the allocation of certain 
scarce commodities like coal, which had previously been distributed 
through the Special Agencies. 
, The European Recovery Programme expresses the common economic 
and political interests of Western Europe, particularly in relation to 
American aid. But the approach to cooperation varies greatly from 
country to country. Switzerland and the small, stable social democracies 
of Scandinavia hang back from commitments which might put them 
at the mercy of social and economic fluctuations in unhealthy laissez-faire 
communities like France and Italy ; strong adults have a duty to the 
ailing but one does not leave a healthy baby in a sickroom. Moreover 
these small countries near the periphery of Western Europe are unwilling 
to take sides in the strategic field ; the present prosperity of Sweden 
and Switzerland is largely due to their successful neutrality through two 
world wars. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey can not easily participate 
in a union based on the values of liberal democracy. Italy is handicapped 
by her ex-enemy status ; though the peace treaty prevents her from 
sharing the defence burden according to her available manpower, her 
utter dependence on imported raw materials gives her an exceptional 
interest in the pooling of European resources. Germany, with the greatest 
• 
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industrial potential in Western Europe, is not yet free to decide her own, 
policies, and her allied guardians cannot agree on a policy for hei. 
In fact, only the Benelux countries, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, 
have shown great enthusiasm for a supra-national authority. 
This confusion of attitudes is recognised in the form taken by the , 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation set up under E R P ! 
The supreme Council contains all sixteen nations under a Chairman 
elected annually-at present the Belgian M. Spaak. The Executive 1 
Committee of seven is open to non-members who may be interested 
in the subject under discussion. The permanent secretariat u11der a 
French Secretary-General is empowered only to prepare agenda and submit 
proposals. But any number of technical committees may be set up by 
the Col1ncil to cover special fields for cooperation. Though the powers 
of 0 E E C depend on mutual agreement, abstention may not prevent 
decision, and it seems that no government will be able to veto joint 
action by others on a matter where its own participation is 11ot required. 
Within the general community of interest expressed in E R P , 
Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg have recognised a 
closer common interest extending also to the strategic field. The Five 
Power Treaty of Brussels has set up permanent organs, including a military 
committee in London ; and greater cooperation in the economic, social 
· and cultural· fields is already being pursued. The Brussels Treaty assumes 
general agreement on all matters of policy, internal or external, which 
directly affect Europe, but divergencies on i\siatic policy are not excluded. 
A full description of the forces influencing the development of 
Europea11 unity must include the attitude of some countries outside 
Europe. The US A is pressing for the fastest and widest extension 
of cooperation between the E R P countries, in order to create a new 
power unit which will be economically viable and strategically secure 
against Russian aggression. This pressure will be exercised not only 
through the usual channels, but also through the American Administrator 
of ERP, Mr. Paul Hoffman, and his European representative, Mr. 
Harriman. For the opposite reasons, Russia will, as Zhdanov said last 
September, ''bend every effort in order that this plan be doomed to 
failure ''. The main instruments of this Russian policy will be direct 
pressure on the · more exposed members of E R P , economic sabotage 
by Communist parties everywhere, and a propaganda campaign for 
national sovereignty. Whether at any point Russia would deliberately 
restrict trade in food and timber from Eastern to Western Europe is 
doubtful, but by no means impossible. 
Fi11ally, Britain must consider the views of other members of 
the Comn1onwealth. Canada would ·welcome a11y ineasures which 
strengthened the North Atlantic Community and associated France 
more closely with the Commonwealth. South Africa would 
be only a~ little less enthusiastic, providing E11ropean Union did 
not weaken the Middle East and Mediterranean, or conflict greatly 
with her African policies. Australia and New Zealand are · suspicious of 
anything which diverts British attention from the Pacific. India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon have no major interest affected. In the economic field there 
I 
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.is no reason why Imperial Preferences should not be protected in any 
new tariff agreements between Britain and the Continent, though the 
' tendency for sterling to become a hard currency within Europe may 
suggest policies for which Dominion agreement is essential. On the 
other hand the possibility of basing permanent relations between Europe 
and the Commonwealth on Europ~'s need for products like grain, meat 
. and wool, and the Commonwealth's need for men and capital goods, 
tmay appeal particularly to the Labour Governments in the Dominions. 
Indeed. Australia and New Zealand cotLld benefit as much from economic 
7 
association with a Western Union as Canada and South Africa from 
strategic association. 
The existing machinery for European cooperation and the different 
national attitudes which have determined its form constitute a framework 
of fact to which any new proposals must be adaptable. So far, two t 
distinct approaches to the problem of European Union have been evident 
-the federalist and the functional. 
The federalists argue that the vested interests threatened by any 
particular proposal for increased cooperation will slow down progress 
below the critical speed ; the real community of interest among the 
European states is not sufficiently apparent if each problem is treated 
separately ; but nations which strain at a million gnats may swallow 
one camel, and limit their individual sovereignty within a federal union. 
Whatever merit this argument may have in general, it is difficult to maintain 
its relevance in the present situation. The dollar problem and the danger 
of war demand immediate action. Any attempt to discuss federation 
now would raise countless general issues unconnected with the really 
urgent proble.ms, and precious months or years would be wasted in 
arguments that were purely academic. 
Moreover there is a strong general case to be made out against 
federation as a reactionary and archaic expedient in a world where the 
state is daily assuming greater powers. The transfer of certain powers 
from national states to a federal government would have to be embodied · 
formally in a written constitution. Constitutions are always restrictive 
and limited in character ; and the separate states would jealously protect 
their remaining powers by explicitly limiting the competence of the 
federal government with a series o·f general vetoes. Thus real opportunities 
for common action might easily be forgone for fear of creating a dangerous 
precedent. The tendency for international constitution-making to restrict 
international action is only too apparent in the Charter of the United 
Nations. Moreover any federal constitution would contain efficient 
safeguards against casual amendment ; President Roosevelt's greatest 
failure arose from his attempt to change the powers of the Supreme 
Court. In the second place the countries of Western Europe differ widely 
in race, language, temperament, political constitutions, and economic 
organisation. Socialists are in a small minority in the area as a whole. 
Imagination reels at the attempt to conceive a constitution which would 
reconcile monarchy with republic, multi-party proportional representation 
with the British two-party system. Finally, w en clearly defined interest-
groups do exist, no written cop.stitution can compel them to act contrary 
t 
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to their deeply-felt interests ; more than most federal governments, 
a European federation would require forcible sanctions against secession, 
and the prolonged and bloody Arr1erican Civil War is not an encouraging 
precedent. 
In fact a European Union will depend on a joint solution of the 
many issues contained in the two central problems already mentioned. 
The techniques by which the ecor1omic problem is best approached are 
discussed elsewhere. But it is necessary to stress once more that if an 
independent European Union is the ain1, everything must be subordinated 
to · the bridging of the dollar gap, with all that involves in changing 
patterns of trade, production and consumption. There is already ample 
evidence to show that · the issues here contained can be dealt with one 
by one by joint action within a general plan providing they are clearly 
understood. And the first duty of Socialists should be to direct public 
attention firmly to these urgent economic issues, away from the constitu-
tional fantasies of federalism. 
Foreign policy is the other field where joint action is both possible 
and necessary. Agreement on foreign policy is a sine qua non of any 
European Union ; and to the extent that agreement is already possible 
a great saving in manpower and material would ensue from a common 
def ~nce policy. This is not the place to discuss the size or armament 
of a European defence force ; but the fall of Czechoslovakia exposes 
tl1e futility of the argument that if Western Europe declared her peaceful 
intentions she would need no force at all. A con1mon defence P.Olicy 
would result both in an immense economic saving and in a major commit-
ment to permanent union. It would be possible to distribute the burden 
of arms production and to divide the military functions in the most 
efficient way-certain nations specialising in land-forces and others 
in naval or air forces. Standardisation of equipment would enable mass-
production techniq11es to be used in peacetime. And many collateral 
benefits would follow ; for example, the French objection to rationalisa-
tion of tractor-production between France and Britain would fall if 
France felt it no longer necessary to maintain her own shadow-factories 
for time of war. 
The major problem which arises in this field is the relation between 
the US A and European defence. It is clear that the ERP countries 
could not produce and equip forces adequate for their own defence 
against Russia without wrecking their plans for economic recovery. 
Some part of the defence burden must be borne directly or indirectly 
by America-eitl1er in troops, or in arms production, or in additional 
aid to off set the loss in production caused by an independent European 
def e·nce programme. 
As far as Britain is concerned it can be assumed that she could never 
afford to fight against America and that she could not def eat a direct 
Russian attack without American help. There is thus no disadvantage 
in a strategic relation between Britain and the U S A which deprived 
Britain of the ability to fight without American agreement. If tl1is is · 
accepted, the best British policy would be to allow America to produce 
the bulk of her arms, so that her own industrial machine was not 
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unbalanced by produci11g goods that are .only useful in war. After her 
experience of wartime Lease Lend, through which she was able to divert 
a dangerous proportion of her economic effort to arms-production, 
Brita_in might well pref er an arrangement which did not overs train her 
peacetime eco11omy. This general relation would l"robabl~1 suit all the 
co tin tries of'\\' estern Europe so long as Russia had no Atlantic submarine 
bases. And it ,~vould have the additional advantage that American aid 
under t11e Recovery Programme and under strategic agreements could be 
treated separately. 
No-one can feel enthusiastic about the necessity for discussing 
such military problems so soon after the end of the Second World War. 
But if national defence forces are considered necessary, there is every 
reason for reduci11g the burden they impose, by international cooperation ; 
and it is well to bear in mind that if the peace loving nations of Western 
Europe ca1111ot soon produce an effective defence system among them-
selves, the temptation to ar1n Europe's only great concentration of surplus 
man.power in Germany and Italy will grow as the last war recedes. 
In any case, collective defence measures are already being discussed 
under the Brussels Treaty, which provides the nucleus for a common 
West-European Foreign Policy. If collective ecop.omic planning is 
pursued through the 0 E E C. , and a common foreign policy is elaborated 
through an expanding Brussels Treaty, there is a chance of solving the 
main problems on whose solution any European Union would depend. 
And in the course of joint action on all the issues which arise in these 
spheres, a powerful network of lasting common interests will emerge. 
The material framework for a completer Union will then exist, and many 
of the suspicions and prejudices which obstruct cooperation today will 
have vanished in the experience of successful teamwork. It is possible 
that in the course of this activity problems may arise which are best 
dealt with by formal limitations of national sovereignty ; but it is most 
unlikely that any new political entity which results from efficient collective 
planning will resemble the federations of the past. 
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WESTERN UNION 
~THE ECONOMIC ASPECT 
by G. D. H. Cole 
Those who speak in favour of the advantages of unity in Western 
Europe, economic as well as political, usually lay much stress on the 
analogy with the United States. The federalists point to the success 
of the ' forty-ninth State ' in giving the American people an immense 
home market free from tariffs or other impediments to trade and in 
making thus possible the vast strides in mass-production that have been 
achieved. If only Europe . . . if even Western Europe . . . . if the 
' Marshall countries ' would follow the American example, what beneficent 
developments, they ask, would not speedily follow ? 
This analogy makes one thing at any rate clear. Even the most 
extreme federalists do not want to cut Europe, or Western Europe, 
off from trade with the rest of the world, any more than the American 
Constitution has cut off the United States. They do, however, in most 
cases contemplate that a federated Europe would, like the United States, 
tend to be less dependent on supplies from outside, and therefore on 
export trade,. than are the separate Sovereign States into which Europe 
is at present divided up. 
This means not only that, witl1 all the barriers down, much trade 
that is now 'foreign' would become 'internal' if all Western Europe 
were counted, like the United States or the Soviet Union, as one cou11try, 
but also that the West European region, behind a common tariff frontier 
and with a common monetary system and at any rate some amount 
of concerted pla11ning, would produce a higher proportion of its require-
ments at home and draw a smaller proportion (not necessarily a smaller 
absolute amount) from other areas. It does not, however, mean that 
Europe-much less tl1at Western Europe-could, or should, aim ·at. 
self-sufficiency ; for to do so, even where it could be done, \Vould plainly 
mean abandoning the advantage of drawing supplies of foodstuffs and 
materials from other areas in exchange for manufactured products and 
for such services as shipping. 
I have put this general consideration in the fore ground in order to 
make it clear at the outset that plans for European, or for West European, 
economic unity have nothing to do with autarkie. Evidently, Western 
Europe alone will need to be more dependent on external trade than a . 
wider grouping including the peasant countries of Eastern Europe would 
need to be. But that is not the point : the aim is not autarkie, but higher 
efficiency ii1 using the combi11ed resources of tl1e economically united 
area, based on a larger home 1narket and also, one hopes, on greater · 
freedom of movement from one European country to another. 
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It must, hovvever, be one of the purposes of a West European, or 
of any European, economic group to reduce its dependence on supplies 
from dollar areas, not out of any wish to discriminate against them, but 
because, and for as long as, they remain inaccessible as markets to a 
sufficient reverse flow of goods. In practice, this means indefinitely ; 
for there is no prospect whatever of the dollar countries, especially the 
United States, becoming consumers of European goods on a sufficient 
scale to balance the proportion of supplies for which the European 
countries at present depend upon them. This remains true even if one 
throws in the results of triangular or multilateral trade in such products 
as tin and rubber from the colonies or economic ' relatives ' of the 
Europea11 States. No doubt, in theory any amount of unbalance could 
be corrected by a sufficient flow of American long-term investment to 
Europe ; but this, even if it could happen, would be highly undesirable, 
as it would tend to convert Europe, or much of it, into an economic 
' colony' of the United States. 
Les·s dependence on dollar supplies, then, is involved in tl1e notion 
of European, or of West European, economic u11ion. This is partly 
a matter of increasing agricultural output. If there can be close trading 
relations between Western and Eastern Europe, a large part of this 
increase can be looked for from the Eastern area : the less Western 
and Easter11 Europe trade with each other, tl1e rr1ore agricultural production 
will have to be increased in the '1Vest, even at rising costs, and therefore 
the lower the West European standards of living will be. No less will 
an economic 'iron curtain' lower standards in Eastern Europe ; for, 
at any rate for some time to come, the Soviet Union will be a market 
chiefly for industrial goods from these countries, and their prosperity will 
depend on their ability to combine industrial development, based on this 
deman'1, with the sale of agricultural products to the West. F'rom the 
Soviet Union they will get chiefly raw materials ; from the Vvest they 
will need capital equipment and consumers' goods which they do not 
produce at home. These points are brought out very clearly in the 
valuable report recently published by tl1e U N 0 European Economic 
Commission. 
It is therefore a great mistake to envisage any plans for West European 
economic union as means of doing without trade between Eastern and 
Western Europe. It may be necessary for the Western co11ntries to make 
special arrangements to develop primary production, especially of fats, 
in their colonial dependencies, and to continue on a wider basis the trade 
relations that have existed between Great Britain and the Dominions 
for the exchange of prin1ary prod11cts for manufactures-especially 
capital goods. But it will be a great misfortune if such measures have 
to replace, rather than supplement, the excha11ges between the mainly 
ind11strial and the mainly agricultural areas of Europe itself. 
In such exchanges, Germany plainly occupies a key position ;· 
for Germany was, before 1939, the principal practical exponent of this 
type of exchange. I will not say that Western Europe without Germany 
· does not make sense as an economic unit ; for, even so truncated, . it 
makes more sense than disunited as it now is. But it is evident that~ 
• 
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT 11 
if Germany were transferred to the sphere of Eastern Europe, a large 
part of the basis for trade between East and the truncated West would 
be knocked away, and the Western rump could avoid becoming a pensioner 
of the United States only by pushing home agricultural production, 
colonial development, and special arrangements with the British Dominions 
and some other non-European countries much further than it would 
otherwise need to do. 
I have no space, in this brief article, to put what I am saying into 
terms of the actual statistics of European production and trade ; and 
there is the less need to do this because Mr. R. W. G. Mackay has con-
veniently summarised many of the essential figures in his recent book, 
Britain in Wonderland (Gollancz, 4/6). The figures show clearly enough 
that even in face of the Economic Nationalism of the inter-war years 
trade between European countries was 1nore important than their trade 
with the rest of tl1e world, and that there was ample room for developing 
it, by throwing down barriers and lowering costs by production for a 
wider market. This is true both of the trade between East and West 
and of that between the Western countries. 
In the light of these facts, what is the right policy for Europe as a 
whole, for Western Europe in particular, and for Great Britain most 
particularly of all ? For Europe as a whole, in face of the present im-
practicability of any sort of union, clearly the right policy is to make 
arrangements for as many exchanges as possible between the "'East and 
the West, and witl1 this in view to maintain and. strengthen tl1e lT N 0 
European Econo1nic Commission, which is the only body able to envisage 
the economic problems of all Europe, irrespective of political differences. 
For Western Europe in particular, the essential thing is to get together, 
not only in order to reduce, and presently to eliminate, tariffs, embargoes, · 
and monetary barriers, but also to plan in common for both hon1e and 
colonial economic development and for the making of combined bulk 
purchase and exchange arrangements with primary producing countries 
outside its area. For Great Britain, the essential thing is to take the lead 
in promoting th·ese measures for Western Europe, and to find ways of 
reconciling them with the special links that bind together Great Britain 
and the self-governing Dominions. 
On this last point, important though it is, I am not free to enlarge 
in this article, because it is being dealt with b·y another contributor. 
I must, however, say one or two things about it. In the first place, none 
of the Dominions is likely to agree to enter into a West European Union 
involving the abolition of custo1ns barriers, even by stages. This can b~ 
ruled out, in view of their determination to develop their own manuf ac-
turing industries. Secondly, Canada, in particular, cannot cut itself 
off from the dollar area, or become a marlcet for European goods on 
a scale anything like sufficient to balance the present flow of Canadian 
foodstuffs to Great Britain.. Thirdly, Great Britain cannot secede from the 
British Commonwealth in order to join a West European Federation, 
and could not, even if the balance of both political and economic advantage 
lay that way. It should, however, be fully possible to adapt to Western 
Europe as a whole the exchanges between primary and manufactured 
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products that have made up the main part of the trade between Great 
Britain and the Dominions-though not without facing the same problem 
of dollar-payments as already besets British trade relations with Canada. 
And it should be possible to arrange for tariff-free entry of foodstuffs 
into Wester11 Europe, combined if need be with tariff-preferences for 
West European goods in the Dominions, by establishing combined 
West European purchasing agencies to make the necessary purchases 
in the Dominions and to hold stocks and re-sell to the European countries 
needing supplies. · 
Side by side with this, what mechanisms ought Western Burow 
to use for regulating its own prodt1ction and its trade with the rest of the 
world? First, a common currency, not tied to the dollar or fettered by 
the rules laid down at Bretton Woods. Secondly, denunciation by agree-
ment of the IT 0 Charter, before its restrictive conditions have time to 
come into force. (The Charter is doing no harm now, only because it 
is not in force, and has been drafted to allow of so many temporary 
exceptions as for the time being to make it virtually inoperative. Its 
. clauses, if in force, would be quite inconsistent with the development 
of West European economic unity, especially in its transitional stages.) 
Thirdly, ar1 agreement to begin at once drastically reducing internal 
tariffs and at the same time f or1nulating an approach to a common 
tariff applying to external trade. (I here include quotas and other similar 
measures vvith tariffs. I hold that quotas are in many cases greatly pref er-
able to tariffs, and am strongly opposed to their outlawry, except where 
they happen to suit the Americans, in the IT 0 Charter.) The reduction 
of internal tariffs is, of course, meant to lead as speedily as possible 
to a full Customs Union ; but nothing should be done to prevent smaller 
groups of countries from advancing to this goal ahead of the West 
.European area as a whole. Fourthly, following upon the estimates already 
made in connection with the Marshall Plan, an attempt to work out, 
for specific branches of production, an agreed West European programme 
designed to allow particular countries to specialise in particular products 
with a full assurance of a wide eno·ugh market to allow costs to be brought 
down ; and therewith, a formulation of an agreed allocation of scarce 
materials, such as coal and steel, as well as of foodstuffs. With this 
might go also an agreed plan for the allocatio11, as well as for the produc-
tion, of certain key types of capital goods, including machine tools and 
transport and power equipment. FiftlLly, an agreement, or agreements, 
to facilitate labour migration from areas of abunda11t to areas of scarce 
man-power-especially from Italy to France and to Great Britain-the 
immigrants to acq11ire full civic rights and a full claim to social services 
in the receiving country. Sixthly, the establishment, besides an inter-
governmental planning control commission, of an international export 
West European plan11ing body, made up 11ot of national delegations, 
. but of independent 1nembers with a West European loyalty. Seventhly, 
the creation of a West European Economic Council, or Parliament or 
Commission, made up of delegations from the national Parliaments, 
to debate and amend the measures proposed by the inter-governmental 
commission, and to become, perhaps, the forerunner of a West European 
Parliament. This last is essential, if West European planning is not to 
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT 13 
be removed from democratic control and is to be more than a treaty-
relation between independent Sovereign States. 
This brings me to the question of Germany. For the present, there 
is evidently nothing possible but to treat Western Germany as belonging 
economically with the West, and Eastern Germany as belonging with the 
East. This is not the West's fault, or to the West's liking ; but it is a 
plain matter of fact. Now, the advocates of immediate political federation 
in Western Germany are involved by this fact in the very great difficulty 
that they have to advocate making the political split in Germany definitive, 
or else to leave all Germany outside their proposed Federal State. Either 
course would be, to say the least, extremely ur1fortuna.te . . If, however, 
what is proposed for Western Europe is not, at this stage, a political 
federation, but only a very close economic union (Zollverein +, not 
Reich), this difficulty does not arise in the same form, or to anything 
like the same extent. Wester11 Germany can be brought in,. as an economic 
unit, through its own economic administration, "'ithout the need for a 
full separate West German Government. 
This, I know, is only one aspect of the German difficulty. The other 
aspect is the very real fear of German economic revival that exists among 
the peoples of Western as. well as of Eastern Europe. This fear is so 
deeply rooted as to be stronger in many quarters than the sense of the 
economic advantages to be derived from a resumption of German trade 
and production ; and it is reinf arced both by the desire of other countries 
to supplant German industries by developing their own and by the feeling 
that it would be wrong for the Germans to receive help in restoring 
their industries as long as restoration in the areas which they laid waste 
is still incomplete. There are also fears of a revived Western Germany 
becoming an economic ' colony ' of United States capitalism, to the 
detriment of the development of industry in other parts of Western 
Europe. 
All this together constitutes a formidable problem, and one which 
has to be solved if the obstacles to Western European collaboration are 
to be cleared away. The solution, it seems, must lie in beginning with 
the question of Ruhr coal and Ruhr steel, a11d ensuring that increased 
production of these shall be accompanied by agreed measures of allocation 
to other European countries and by control of the finishing industries 
based on crude steel designed to prevent the creation of an industrial 
complex that might endanger the peace of Europe. This involves inter-
natio11al control of the heavy engineering and chemical industries of 
Western Germany, and of the imports into Germany of non-ferrous 
metals. It seems evident that there will have to be some sort of Inter-
national Commission to supervise, under the instructions of the West 
European Economic Union, the whole complex of heavy industries in 
the Ruhr ; but it is no less clear that the German economic ' government ' 
ought to be represented as an equal partner on this Commission. Of 
course, one great problem in connection with all this is that of the o\vner-
ship of the Ruhr mines and steel works. It is out of the question either 
to hand these back to German private enterprise, tainted as it is with 
Nazism, or to allow them to pass virtually into American ownership, 
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. either by open purcl1ase or by holding through German nominees. 
There is really no alternative to public ownership ; and for the present 
the only appropriate legal owner would seem to be the proposed Inter-
national Commission itself, as trustee for the German people, either 
exclusively i11 the long run, or, perhaps, in conjunction with other peoples 
of the West organised in a supra-national State capable of owning and 
developing its vital industries on a basis, not of nationalisation, but 
of federal supra-nationalisation. That, however, is looking ahead much 
further than this article is meant to look. 
It is possible that, even before these words are published, some part 
of what I have written \Vill need revision because of further developments 
in the German situation. Should the Western Governments decide, 
in view of the deadlock with the Russians, to proclaim a German political 
Government (I hope, if they do, they will proclaim it as meant for all 
Germany and not for the Western Zones only), some things that I hav~ 
said will need re-stating ; but my points will be but little affected. I do 
not want the Western Powers to set up a German Government yet, 
because I do not want to see anything done that will make accommodation 
with the Russians even more difficult than it is bound to be. But, if 
they do, it will remain necessary to mal<e much the same arrangements 
for the control of German industry and of the Ruhr as if they do not ; 
and my belief that the right line of irnmediate advance towards closer 
West European unio11 is economic rather than constitutional vvill remain 
unaffected. , 
While I take this attitude, I wish as strongly as I can to emphasise 
that reliance on economic measures involves that these measures shall 
be far-reaching and backed by the full weight of the British Government. 
The danger, I recognise, is that the rejection of immediate constitutional 
in favour of economic integration may be used as an excuse for doip.g 
nothing except by halves. There is even the danger that the arrival of 
Marsl1all Aid may be used, as the United States Loan was used in 1946, 
to stave off decision, though it should have been plain, and should be 
plain now, that American help can provide no more than a respite, 
and that measures designed to bring real remedies are bound to take 
a considerable time to produce substantial effects. Such policies as colonial 
develop1nent and the planned reorientation of West European industries 
to meet the demands of a combined free market necessarily take a con-
siderable period to execute even after they have been planned ; and the 
pla11ning is also bound to be a difficult and lengthy affair. There is 
accordingly every reason for making a really decisive start, over the widest 
possible field, at the earliest possible moment, so as to have different 
groups of experts working simultaneously on the various parts of the 
plan while the essential controlling machinery for the whole is being 
devised and set up. It would be much better to attempt too much tl1an 
too little ; and, though I do not favour an attempt to set up a co11stitutional 
political Federation of Western Europe here and now, I would very 
much sooner see that than see the real issues burked by the taking of 
merely half-hearted measures in the economic sphere. 
15 
WESTERN UNION 
-THE IMPERIAL ASPECT 
by Rita Hinden 
What is the 'imperial aspect' of Western Union? For British 
people two clearly-cut problems immediately suggest themselves. Th_ere 
is, firstly, the question of planning colonial production joi11tly with the 
other Colonial Powers of Western Europe. The purpose, here, is to 
develop, with tl1e utmost efficiency, supplies of raw 1naterials and food-
stuff s which are independent of the dollar areas, and to be relied on in 
all emergencies. The second question is of a diff erei1t character-how 
can this country harmonise its special relations with the Don1inions/ 
with the new commitments which an integration within Western Europe 
would involve ? 
· The first of these problems might be seen as a technical matter only-
a problem of social engineering. If the Colonies were really our possessions 
to do with as we will, then indeed tech11ical considerations would be 
almost all that rr1attered. Let us look at it, for a moment, on this level. 
There is no doubt at all that, if the right techniques could be ap_plied, 
the Colonies would offer immense possibilities of development. There 
are potential resources-many of great value-which have barely even 
been s11rveyed. Methods of production are backvvard, and could be 
modernised so as to multiply the produce of the soil. Precious tin1ber 
resources abound in certain areas, and remain untapped. Scarcely a 
beginning has been made in developing power supp1ies, and with power 
there are prospects of a whole range of new industries. Dairying, fishing 
and the meat industry are all said to be capable of dramatic expansion. 
On all these possibilities, work is now being done. The Colonial Office 
has research committees on all subjects ; it has s11rveys everywhere 
on hand ; and technical commissions are constantly being sent to inquire 
into specific possibilities. · Furthermore, consultation with the other 
Colonial Powers on a host of relevant problems has already begun. 
In February, for example, an Anglo-French Colonial Conference discussed 
action regarding marl<eti11g policy, communications, inter-colonial trade, 
and colonial developme11t. In the same month an Anglo-French-Belgian 
Labour Conference was held in Nigeria, whicl1 dealt with problems 
arising out of the organisation of labour in Africa. There have also 
been conferences (attended by the Portuguese), on sleeping sickness, 
forestry and control of plant diseases ; and inter-territorial conferences 
have taken place on medical matters, tele-communications, etc. An 
impressive network of joint consultation has already been woven, drawing 
together all the Powers with administrative responsibilities in Africa, 
and also in the West Indies. 
16 THE IMPERIAL ASPECT 
But in all these discussions and investigations, the planners soon 
knock their heads against the stone wall of the basic technical limitations 
on colonial development. These are shortages of equipment-machinery, 
rails, locomotives, tools ; and the shortage of skilled manpower -not 
only engineers and other experts, b11t skilled workmen, artisans and drivers. 
These shortages are of a most serious nature. In Britain a tug-o' -war 
develops around the allocation of every ton of steel-shall it be for 
export so as to buy food ? shall it be for re-equipping the home industry ? 
shall it be for houses and schools ? or shall it be for colonial development ? 
. If the equipment and man power which is in such short supply is to be 
allocated to colonial development, a reasonably quick return in the form 
of goods is expected. But unfortunately there are few colonial crops 
which have a short period of production-some take 5-7 years from 
the date of planting-and even if this were not so, there is so much 
preliminary work to be done _in preparing the land, providing the 
machinery, and training the labour, that rapid returns are impossible. 
For these reasons it would be unrealistic to expect too much from 
colonial development in the short run. The Colonies could off er no 
alternative to trade with the pri1nary producing countries of Eastern 
Europe, and to some degree of dependence on dollar areas. To think 
of a Western Union which aspires to be self-supporting with the aid 
of colonial produce in the near fut11re, is to live in a fool's paradise ! 
At least ten years must elapse before impressive results can be shown 
from even the most energetic development and the most liberal capital 
investment. 
If "'Ne vvere Tories there would be nothing further to say about this-
we would accept the desirability of a joint planning of colonial development 
without pinning any immediate hopes on its results. But, as Socialists, 
we cannot regard the Colonies as mere appendages for us to develop 
according to our ow11 whims and needs. We must grapple with the 
question of ho"'' to combine development with the advance to self-
government, to which we are com1nitted in our own Colonies. We 
must confront the difficulties of securing the cooperatio11 of the Colonies 
in growing the products we want-they have behind them a history 
of distrust against concentrating their production on primary products 
alone. And we are 011ly at the t;>eginning of evolving techniques of 
consultation with the colonial peoples in order to win their cooperation. 
All these difficulties become more complicated than ever as soon as we 
enter joint planni11g arrangements with the other Powers. Their political 
and economic approach to colonial questions is often vastly different 
from our own. Political advance has been slower within n1ost other 
Colonies than in the British ; labour organisation is less advanced ; 
and means of consultation even less evolved than with us. 
The political questions are of the most far-reaching importance 
because the colonial people are not in any way interested in Western 
Union, and in our n.eed to find economic and political salvation by 
these means. In this country, ma11y do u11derstand the importance of 
unity and are prepared to make efforts, even sacrifices, for this end. 
But this could hardly be expected of simple people-and even of the less 
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simple-in far-off Africa. Tl1ey already begin to feel, with no little 
resentment, that in Europe's need, a new pla11 to ' exploit ' Africa is 
being launched. They hear of schemes for doing this and that ii1 their · 
countries, and they are not consulted. Their suspicions are already 
mounting, and if they become unco-operative, all plan11ing will be un-
availing, because it is on their manpower that every project is t1tterly 
dependent. 
To preve11t non-cooperation an extremely political approach is· 
needed on the colonial side. It might be outlined under three heads :-
(a) If a Charter of Political Rights is to be written into the framework 
of Western Union-as suggested by Mr. Attlee-these political rights 
must be made specifically to apply to the Colonies. It may ·not be possible 
for them all to become independent tomorrow and enjoy the complete 
political privileges they would like, but it does mean that we rr1ust drop 
our attitude of imperialist domination. Our administration remains 
' imperialist ', and therefore resented, as lo~g as it is something imposed 
without consent no matter how paternal tl1e intention. Imposition must 
be replaced by consultation and the deliberate winning of consent and 
co-operation. This is not the place to elaborate how this should be done-
but it is impossible to overstress the importance of a new approach, 
on the basis of equal partnership, towards tl1e colonial peoples. 
(b) From the British point of view we must understand tl1at wl1atever 
we do in our own Colonies, we will still be accused of h;rpocrisy if we 
collaborate with other Colonial Powers who continue in their old im-
perialist way. It will fall to us to ensure that the new attitude of partner-
ship and consultation should be adopted by all the Western Powers. 
Here we have a magnificent opportunity to lead the way away from the 
old and hated colonial system. 
(c) In the working out of the development schemes scrupulous 
regard should be paid to-a fair deal for the colonial peoples. It is essential 
that they themselves be represented in the machinery of the schemes, 
and also that Socialist opinion at home should be ' eternally vigilant ' 
in their implementation. There should, for example, be joint marketing 
arrangements assuring the same fair prices to producers in all Colonies ; 
facilities for workers' organisation, labour co11ditions and so on should 
correspond in the different areas ; and similar relations between the 
racial groups working on the schemes should everywhere be striven for. 
If a political approach of this nature could be infused into the colonial 
development planning of a Western Union, giant strides might be taken, 
not only in raising standards of life in the Colonies, and, incidentally, 
raising our own-but also in solving a good deal of' the Colonial problem' 
as such. Perhaps ~his alone might be considered a worthy justification 
for proceeding with Western Unity ! . 
Let us revert now to our second problem-that of the Dominions. 
Here quite a different set of considerations arise. The Dominions cannot 
be brought in against their will, as the Colonies might-they must be 
wooed and won by the advantages of the schemes. This puts Britain 
in a very different position from France, Holland and Belgium-she 
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~ust carry the Dominions with her by goodwill and take account of 
their reactions to her every step. 
There is no question of the Dominions themselves entering into the 
Union, but they are nat11rally deeply concerned as to how Britain's 
new commit1nents in Europe are likely to influence Commonwealth 
affairs. At the moment, Dominion opinion has not crystallized ; in 
each Dominion the matter is seen differently and there are certainly 
a number of misgivings. The Dominions, we ,should never forget, have 
a traditional dislike of firm commitments, which spring from the peculiar 
nature of the evolution of the Commonwealth. They react nervously 
to any news of Britain entering into new firm commitn1ents in Europe. 
Yet on economic gro11nds there may be no disadvantages to them-
in fact tl1ere may be a positive advantage ii1 having the organised markets 
of the whole of Western Europe to trade with. Nor need this necessarily 
involve the loss of imperial pref ere nee-at least until there is a complete 
Customs Union in \\lester11 Europe, which is still a remote Utopia. 
It is possible, too, that on political and strategic. grounds, they may see 
advantage in the new developments. Each Dominion will undoubtedly 
have to engage in its own complicated process of weighing-uJ? the pros 
and co11s. What this means 'for Britain is a certain delicacy in going 
forward, as it would be a tragedy if a rift developed within Commonwealth, 
and if integration with Western Europe were secured only at the expense 
of disintegration on the imperial side. 
Sin1i1arly the attitude of the new Asiatic Dominions has not been 
defined. But there, our handling of Colonial policy may well prove a 
decisive factor. They will be more than hesitant about association with 
an 'imperialist' Western Europe. But a European Unity which was 
based on the liberation of Colonial peoples and their raising to new 
star1dards of prosperity might easily secure their enthusiasm and support. 
This is no minor matter ; it may indeed be one of the keys to the success 
of any scheme. Yet it has barely been mentioned in all the talks of the 
new European Unity ! 
Looking at it from the Imperial angle, therefore, Western Union 
might be seen as an adventure in economic planning, or as an extraordinary, 
historic opportt1nity for ending the old evils of the colonial system-
poverty, neglect and political subjugation-with the eventual elimination 
of ' colonialism ' itself. If we make the mistake off ocussing on economic 
planning alone, we will bemuse ourselves with statistical tables, and 
lose sight of that decisive factor in the situation-the political attitudes 
of the colonial peoples, and of the new Asiatic Dominions. Further, 
in our desire to secure as favourable a statistical result as possible, we 
will unwittingly find ourselves ranged with the Tories, the Joseph Chamber-
lain Imperialists, and the hard-faced business-men, who in their deter-
mination to wring every ounce of produce out of our ' neglected estates' 
(~oseph Chamberlain's description of Africa in 1870 !) will be prepared 
to clamp down an ever more ruthless imperialism on the peoples of the 
Colonies, to c0erce their labour, to withold their political development 
and stamp on their liberties. Lest anyone should think this a childish 
bogy, let him ponder these words of Colonel Ponsonby, a Tory M.P. 
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and chairman of the Joint East Africa Board in a letter to the Times of 
March 31 :-
Up to a year or two ago the poli~y was' Africa for the Africans', 
which implied indirect rule and a consequent stagnation in progress, 
as has been emphasised lately by the Governor of Uganda. Now 
the opposite course is being pursued. In order to increase the world 
production of raw materials, the word has gone out, ' Full speed 
ahead ', which means that the native African gradually must continue 
to come less and less under the rule of the chief and more and more 
to be part of an active European organisation whether agricultural or 
industrial. In order to carry out the new policy, tribal habits and 
customs have had to go by the board. This is probably the best 
for the African in the long run, but the Government must say so 
quite frankly and not wrap it up in pious hopes about the Africans 
taking over the management of or becoming the owners of great 
enterprises. The 'New Deal' does mean an alteration in the ' Old 
Policy '. It must be made clear to the Africans of Northern Rhodesia 
and similar countries that it will be several generations before they 
will have sufficient experience honestly and capably to take a real 
part in great enterprises or in the administration of the country, 
and that in these days no one is fit to govern who desires power 
without responsibility. 
The economic planning must of course be done, but it would be 
wiser for Socialists to leave the details of this to Government Departments, 
at1d put their energies, instead, into seizing the political opportunities 
which Western Union offers for writing ' paid' to the abuses of the 
colonial system. It is a very real opportunity, and we could be sure of 
carrying with us in this task, an enthusiastic Asia, and an appreciative 
America-North and South. There is a fundamental choice before us, 
between two antagonistic imperial policies. We should at least be 
absolutely clear, in our own minds, of the implications of each. 
• 
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may be considered as a sequel to the report prepared by the same author for 
the Fabian Society, and published in 1944, entitled Retail Trade Associations. 
Taking as his starting-point the multiplicity of retail outlets, Professor Levy 
analyses the reasons for their existence by reference to several trades. Consideration 
of prices, margins and the effects of competition serves as a preliminary to an 
absorbing discussion of the methods by which distribution costs may be reduced. 
Broadly, there are two ways ''to improve the mechanism of distribution with 
a view to reducing costs .... One is the method of restriction ; it aims at reducing 
or stabilising the number of retail outlets in order to effect economies by centralisa-
tion or amalgamation. The other method starts from the assumption that over-
retailing is not the cause but the effect of mal-organisation, and aims at remedying 
this mal-organisation and devising the means of rationalising the various functions 
of retailing where this appears possible.'' 
After a reasoned rejection of the method of restriction whether by licensing 
or limitation of price con1petition through resale price maintenance, Professor 
Levy turns to consider the " more modest-looking possibilities of achieving greater 
economies in shopkeeping ''. Better organisation of processing, the elimination 
of certain ''productive" functions performed by retailers, the expansion of 
open-air markets and the co-operative or municipal distribution of coal and milk 
which have " outgrown the necessity for individ11al private enterprise '' are all 
discussed at length. Expansion of direct trading between manufacturer and 
retailer in the case of the more standardised articles might yield substantial 
economies in his opinion, while intermediary expenses might also be reduced by 
co-operative buying by retailers. 
This is a book well-worth reading by every student of distribution. It clearly 
explains the present organisation of retail trade and leaves the reader in no doubt 
of the problems to be solved. 
R. W. E. 
A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES Ed Quincy Wright 
(University of Chicago Press: Cambridge University Press 25 /-) 
It is now almost two years since the distinguished contributors to this volume 
set forth their views on American foreign policy under the auspices of the Norman 
Wait Harris Memorial Foundation. They discuss in 15 chapters the relations 
between the US and the UK, the USSR, the UN, Eastern Europe, Near and 
Far East, Latin America, World Trade, Informational Policies and the Atom 
Bomb. Each contribution is an essay on some particular political or economic 
problem. The 392 pages do not add up to a Foreign Policy for the United States, 
nor, it must be said, do they throw very much light on the foreign policy of the 
United States. 
"'e live from day to day in foreign affairs. A volun1e written in July 1946 
by various authors, is unlikely to be an adequate basis for understanding present, 
and estimating future, trends. Only the boldest and most general prognostication 
can hope to stand up to the test of fast-moving events. In this regard the con-
tribution on the Near East by John A. Wilson of the University of Chicago is 
the most valuable. Here the reader comes nearest to an understanding of the 
dilemma of American Foreign Policy. ''Now it is clear that we have the most 
definite interest in the oil of the Persian Gulf. Now it is clear that the strategic 
concerns of any great power extend all over the globe. We can no longer enjoy 
the rep11tation of being the great democracy which had no expansionist ambition 
and could therefore be the champion of small peoples .... We are in the position 
of urging Great Britain insistently to do her duty, of aiding in establishing what 
that duty may be, and then of withdrawing loftily and leaving her to undertake 
the unpleasant task of carrying out that duty. Our idealism must appear as 
officious or hypocritical unless we follow up our initiative and assist in establishing 
a new order in Palestine." These are the facts of life. They govern the tranquillity 
of the Middle East, the fate of Zionism, and the political future of President 
Truman. 
R.H. P. 
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EDUCATION : THE NEW HORIZON By Harold C. .Shearman (Nicholson 
& Watson 6/-) 
The book begins with a fascinating story of educational progress in this country. 
Compared with many foreign states, we started late in the race. When Whit bread's 
Education Bill of 1807 was under discussion, the writer tells us, no less a personage 
than the then President of the Royal Society, Davies Gidding, could argue that 
· to extend education to the labouring classes " would, in effect, be prejudicial 
to their morals and happiness . . . . teach them to despise their lot in life, . . . . 
make them fractious and refractory and enable them to read seditious pamphlets ". 
Not until the 'seventies was a state system of compulsory elementary education 
belatedly created and then in the old tradition ''to be suited to the needs of 
workmen and servants". It was the Education Act, 1902 . (in those days of 
Fabian permeation of the Tory and Liberal Party in office to be known as " Webb 
Act") which first gave power to local education authorities to provide secondary 
education and to develop the scholarship ladder that enabled the able pupil to 
climb from the elementary to the secondary or ' Grammar ' school, and so 
on to a university. But the broad highway of secondary education for all had 
to wait for the Education Act, 1944. In the prestige of the independent 'public 
school ', in the concessions made to the ' direct grant ' school, in the conflict 
between those who advocate the comprehensive secondary school and those 
who pref er to select pupils of the secondary stage for different types of education 
in different types of school, may still be found the defects of the old social or 
class divisions. Not least attractive are the well-chosen illustrations co1nparing 
the old with the new. 
B. D . 
. 
THE BUILDING INDUSTRY By Harry Barham (St. Botolph 5 /- ) 
In this unpretentious book of one hundred pages, Harry Barham argues a con-
vincing case for socialisation of the building industry. He does more; he suggests 
a new structure for the industry designed to remove its basic defects. Both the 
need for large-scale organisation and the attainment of industrial democracy in 
the industry, makes a National Building Service essential. 
The author suggests that the base unit of this Service, the Local BuildiI1g 
Organisation, should comprise the whole of the building plant and personnel 
in any town or district. This Organisation should be governed by the whole 
of the building workers in its area, and should be linked by districts and regions 
with the National Building Council. The Government and Local Authorities 
should be represented on this Council, but the rest of its members should be 
appointed from the industry itself. Not the least important chapter in the book 
deals with the problems of the transition stage, and the questions of the small 
builder, material supplies and incentives are also discussed. 
R. W. E. 
TALKING OF FILMS By R. J. Minney (Home & Van Thal 6/-) 
A brief account of the film business, from a feature film producer's angle. Readable, 
but superficial. There is no real appreciation of the social role of the film in 
contemporary life. 
The book's most useful contribution is to show the crazy nature of film finance. 
Production costs have soared; extravagance, waste, inefficiency have gone 
unchecked. The present crisis in British production is the result. Every big film 
executive should take the lesson of Talking of Films to heart. But will they ? 
- . -
S~ R. 
j 
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TWO PAMPHLETS 
BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM By Allan Flanders (By post from the Bureau 
of Current Affairs 2/-) 
A short, straightforward and comprehensive account, covering the growth, 
tradition, organisation, activities and policy of the Trade Union Movement in 
this country. A very good primer for those wishing to begin to study the move-
ment, and a good refresher for those who have been Trade Unionists for many 
years. 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A case for their greater use (Association of 
Scientific Workers 1 /6) · 
Starting from the suspicion that the Clapham Report under-estimated the urgency 
of the need to develop the social sciences, this pamphlet states the case for bolder 
measures. That such measures are needed cannot be denied, and this contribution 
to the struggle to obtain them is to be welcomed. 
J. L. J. 
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Appointments and Situationi V&cant 
None o/ the vacancies in these colu1nns r~ 
latea to a man between 18 and 60 inclusivF or 
a tcoman hetween 18 and 40 inclusii·e unles' 
ht or she is excepted from the prot'ision of the 
Control of Engaqement Order, 1947, or tht 
tacancy is for employment excepted from tht 
frorision 01 that Order. 
JUNTOR ADVERTISEMENT REPRE-SENTATIVES required both sexes, for 
a group of magazines. Applicants must 
have had real experience as space salesmen. 
GOOD WAGES, prospects. Co-partnership _ 
scheme being formulated. Apply, giving 
full details past experience to Box No· 456 
Fabian Quarterly, 173, Fleet St., E.0.4. 
Clerlcal Asslatanee 
TYPEWRITING. Miss L. G. Phillips, South Cot, Menabilly, Par, Cornwall, will 
accept orders. Terms by arrangement. 
Confidential. 
For Sale 
"pERSONNA" Precision Hollow-Ground 
Double-edge Razor Blades. Fine as a 
rare jewel. Ten for 5s.-.A.. W. CROSSLEY, 
22, Cranbourne Road, Chellow Dean, Brad-
ford, Yorkshire. 
•• SAVE as You Shave."-Lillicrap's Hone 
ensures this. Price 2s., post paid.-
A. W. CROSSLEY, 22, Cranbourne Road, 
Chellow, Dean Bradford, Yorkshire. 
FURNISHING F .A.BRIO, DYED HESSIAN, No Coupons, Close Weave. 
Ideal for curtains. Attractive shades: Gold, 
Brown, G!'een, Sky, Rust. 40 ins. wide. 
6/11 yard, postage 1/-. Samples available. 
Please send 6d. stamps.-CELIO LTD., 
DEPT. F/Q, MAIL ORDER STORES, BEDFORD. 
•pon SALE. 16 mm. Silent and Sound 
Film Projectors. Perfect. Ideal for Club, 
Hall, School, Lectures, etc. Very reasonable 
prices. Send for list. CLIFFORD SPARKES, 
69, Fortis Green, N .2. 
Where to Dine. 
•wAYFARER'S RESTAURANT and Caf6 
Continentale, 20, Granville Place, 
Orchard Street, W.l. Tel.: Mayfair 5125. 
Open from noon till 11 p.m. Lunches (3/6 
and 6/-), Dinners (5/-), afternoon teas, ices, 
light refreshments. No house charges. 
Excellent Continental cuisine and pAtisserie 
from own bakery. Tables bookable for 
dinners. 
... 
Personal 
L AMB BRAND TYPEWRITER RIB-BONS. Clean, Enduring. 40/- doz., 
21/- six, 11/6 three, 4/- each. Postage paid. 
Please name model(s), colours. MARTIN 
HARDMAN, 15, Prospect Place, Preston. 
THE Advert. Dept. is taking a Readershlp Survey of the Fabian Quarterly. You 
are invited to co-operate. Kindly send a 
list of your general interests, hobbies, etc. 
to Advertisement Manager, Fabian 
Quarterly, 173, Fleet Street, London, E.C.4. 
off· A VE you read the latest Quaker Book ? 
Trarelling with Thomas Story, by 
Emily Moore. (Letchworth Printers Ltd.) 
Price 15/-, illustrated • 
Where to Stay 
BUDE, CORN"\V .A.LL. Country by the Sea. Atlantic Guest House, Summer-
leaze Crescent, on Sea Front. Vegetarians 
welcomed. Every comfort and personal 
supervision. 
A XIVth CENTURY HOUSE with modern comforts. Central heating, 
coal and log fires, electric fires and h. & c. 
basins in all bedrooms. Excellent small 
library. Good food and individual atten-
t.ion. Apply: THE RESIDENT MANAGER, 
The Old House, Milton-on-~tour, Gillingham. 
Dorset. Telephone : Gillingham 222. 
SOMERSET. COSSINGTON HO-CSE, Cossington, Nr. Bridgwater. Private 
Guest House. Open all year round. English 
and Continent.al Cookin~. On the Folden 
Hills between Mendips and Quantocks. 
Inclusive Terms: £4 4~. Od. per week. 
BLUE IDOL (QUAKER) GUEST ~~ HOUSE, Coolham, Horsham, in a, 
secluded fold of Sussex Weald. Wiliiam 
Penn associations. HELEN AND WILLIAM 
DURRANT ('Phone: Coolham 241). 
VACANCIES: JUNE, JULY, SEPT-EMBER,,-Mrs. WOODWARD, Rosedale, 
Church Street, Oombe Martin, North 
Devon. 
H OLIDAYS? Join a party arranged for professional and university people 
wanting informal holiday ABROAD or in 
Great Britain; also independent holidays 
planned. Personal contacts with many 
countries abroad special attraction. ERNA 
Low, 9, Reece Mews, London, S.W.7. 
Kensington 0911. 
•oEVON (DA WLISH), and CORNWALL 
(NEW QUAY). Ideal for early holidays. 
Happy companionship. Good food. Com-
fortable beds. Free illustrated brochure. 3. 
Bishop, "Fairfield," Dawlish. Tel. 2151. 
ADVERTISEMENTS 
.Ill 1ommunleatlona re1pecUn1 AdverUalng ahould be addressed to-
ADV E RTl S EM ENT DEPARTMENT, FABIAN QUARTERLY 
173, Fleet Street, London, E.C.4. 
WHEN ANSWERING .ADVERTISEKBNTS KINDLY MJCNTION TRB FABIAN 
QU.A.RTBRLY. 
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HEFFER'S 
of CAMBRIDGE 
for BOOKS on 
ECONOMICS AND 
SOCIOLOGY 
* 
ENGLISH AND FOREIGN 
NEW AND SECONDHAND 
Catalogues issued 
BUYERS OF FINE, RARE 
AND SCHOLARLY BOOKS 
W. HEFFER & SONS LTD. 
The Bookshop knoii'll the l'Vorld orer 
PET'l'Y CURY 
i==~fiii,.iii!iiiiiiid~& I iJ ti I •liiiiiiilliiiiiillH==-' 
- . 
- •• f t ~-
Ready Shortly ! 
Peaee Year Book 
1948 
ls. net 
The Atomie Bomb 
In World Polities 
Edward Shils. 
ls. net 
(Postage 2d. extra in both cases) 
NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL 
144, Southampton Row, London, W.C.I 
. . . - ::_ ~ ! . • . . . . . • .. . ' ., . -; ~ . " 
osters 
that~ 
THE HEREFORD TIMES LTD. 
Creative Artistic Printers 
173-5, FLEET STREET 
L 0 ND 0 N, E. c. 4 
catch the eye 
KEEP ABREAST 
of 
Colonial Affairs 
by reading 
WASU 
MAGAZINE 
QUARTERLY 
'' The most important 
document for any student 
of British Colonial Affairs 
to-day. 11 
" OBSE.RVE.R" in " West Africa " 
ENLARGED and ILLUS-
TRATED at 1/6 per copy 
from your bookshop 
or (1/7 post free) from 
BUSINESS MANAGER 
175, Fleet Street, E.C.4 
Printed by The Hereford Times Ltd., General Printing Works (T.U.), London and Hereford. L4609 
